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A Reconsideration of the Katz Expectation of Privacy Test 
When the Supreme Court decided Katz v. United States1 in 
1967, some commentators viewed the case as paving the way for 
possible expansion of fourth amendment2 protection3 against un-
reasonable search and seizure. 4 Subsequent developments in gen-
eral fourth amendment jurisprudence, however, suggest that this 
hope has not been realized. Indeed, several recent cases have actu-
ally narrowed the scope of fourth amendment protection. 5 Given 
these developments, it is once again6 appropriate to analyze the 
1. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
2. The fourth amendment states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things 
to be seized. 
3. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HARV. L. REV. 63, 190 (1968) 
[hereinafter cited as Supreme Court]. 
4. The "unreasonableness clause" of the fourth amendment-which states that 
"[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated"-could have origin-
ally been interpreted as having meaning independent of the warrant clause. See N. 
LASSON, ToE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTII AMENDMENT TO THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 103 (1937). By the time Katz was decided, however, 
the Court considered the question of the umeasonableness of a search or seizure 
merely in terms of whether the police had met the warrant requirement of the amend-
ment. See generally Note, Formalism, Legal Realism, and Constitutionally Protected 
Privacy Under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 90 HARV. L. REV. 945 (1977); 
Note, The Life and Times of Boyd v. United States (1886-1976), 16 MICH. L. REV. 
184, 201-03 (1977). This Note is limited to a consideration of whether the right to 
have expectations of privacy should prevent governmental searches in the absence of 
a warrant. 
5. As Justice Brennan noted in his dissenting opinion in United States v. Mar-
tinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 567 (1976), that decision was the ninth that Term 
"marking the continuing evisceration of Fourth Amendment protections against un-
reasonable searches and seizures." The other eight decisions cited by Justice Brennan 
were Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 
(1976); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976); Andresen v. Macyland, 
427 U.S. 463 (1976); United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976); United States 
v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976); and 
Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1976). 
For a general discussion of recent federal court decisions that arguably narrow 
the scope of several constitutional rights, see Brennan, State Constitutions and the Pro-
tection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977). But cf. Israel, Criminal 
Procedure, the Burger Court, and the Legacy of the Warren Court, 15 MICH. L. REV. 
1319 (1977) (suggesting that the Burger Court decisions involving criminal pro-
cedure have not eviscerated any fundamental rights of the defendant). 
6. For other analyses, see Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amend-
ment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349 (1974); Dutile, Some Observations on the Supreme 
Court's Use of Property Concepts i11 Resolving Fourth Amendment Problems, Zl 
CAm. U.L. REV. 1 (1971); Note, Katz and the Fourth Amendment: A Reasonable 
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"reasonable expectation of privacy"7 standard enunciated in Katz. 
In holding that the fourth amendment "protects people, not 
places,"8 the court in Katz indicated that the "constitutionally pro-
tected areas" or "trespass" standard applied in prior cases9 would 
no longer be controlling.10 Yet, if the sanctity of the home, which 
is the paradigm constitutionally protected area, is to continue to be 
recognized as a core value11 of the fourth amendment, then the 
formulation and application of the reasonable expectation of privacy 
test should be modified in certain respects. To ensure that the 
fourth amendment has some minimum content that cannot be de-
fined away by either the goveqiment or the courts, these modifica-
tions should give paramount importance to the value of living one's 
daily life, particularly in one's own home, free from arbitrary and 
excessive governmental intrusion.12 Preserving this value entails 
recognizing that the fourth amendment does not simply protect ex-
Expectation of Privacy or, A Man's Home Is His Fort, 23 CLEv. ST. L. REV. 63 
(1974); Note, The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy-Katz v. United States, a 
Postscriptum, 9 IND. L. REV. 468 (1976); Note, From Private Places to Persona~ 
Privacy: A Post-Katz Study of Fourth Amendment Protections, 43 N.Y.U.L. REV. 
968 (1968). 
7. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
8. 389 U.S. at 351. 
9. Under this standard, governmental intrusion did not constitute a search under 
the fourth amendment unless it involved invasion of a protected area. See, e.g., On 
Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 
(1942). 
10. 389 U.S. at 353. 
11. This value, as well as others, was articulated in the early landmark case of 
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886), discussed in Note, 76 MICH. L. 
REV. 184, supra note 4. The Supreme Court has continued to articulate this value. 
See text at notes 100-13 infra. 
Courts have compared other areas to the home in order to determine whether 
they should be constitutionally protected. See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 
U.S. 42, 52 (1970) (automobiles); Ponce v. Craven, 409 F.2d 621, 624 (9th Cir. 
1969) (motel rooms). 
12. In Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), decided a few months 
prior to Katz, the Court said: 
The basic purpose of [the Fourth] Amendment, as recognized in countless 
decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals 
against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials. The Fourth Amendment 
thus gives concrete expression to a right of the people which "is basic to a free 
society." 
387 U.S. at 528 (citation omitted). 
Courts have also interpreted the fourth amendment as protecting other values, 
such as the right to be let alone (United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859, 870 (5th 
Cir. 1975), affd. in part and revd. in part per curiam on rehearing, 537 F.2d 227 
(5th Cir. 1976) ), the right of individuality (Fix.el v. Wainwright, 492 F.2d 480, 483 
(5th Cir. 1974)), the security of persons and property (Alderman v. United States, 
394 U.S. 165, 175 (1969)), the right of personal liberty (Lopez v. United States, 
373 U.S. 427, 455 ( 1963) ( dissenting opinion)), and the right of personal dignity 
(Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 (1968)). Common to all these characterizations is 
the premise that a person's daily activities are not subject to constant or arbitrary 
govemmental scrutiny. 
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pectations of privacy; rather, it protects the right to have certain 
· expectations of privacy. In short, the minimum content of the fourth 
amendment is the minimum set of expectations of privacy to which 
people are entitled. 
This Note, by modifying certain aspects of the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test, offers a theory that attempts to identify 
the minimum content of the fourth amendment. In the first section, 
the Note examines the reasonable expectation of privacy test and 
considers whether it has been or can be applied in a manner that 
fails to protect the right to have certain minimum expectations of 
privacy. It analyzes both the "actual" and the "reasonable" expec-
tation requirements, identifies weaknesses inherent in the current 
application of these requirements, and suggests certain ways in which 
they might be refined. In the second section, the Note looks beyond 
the literal requirements of the refined reasonable expectation of 
privacy test to consider whether even after modification the test ade-
quately protects the values implicit in the fourth amendment. First 
observing that the Court has continued to identify the sanctity of the 
home as being at the core of the amendment and then observing 
that the pre-Katz open field-curtilage distinction continues to play 
a significant role in the resolution of fourth amendment cases, it 
demonstrates that the "constitutionally protected areas" test is not 
inconsistent with Katz. In the final section, the Note concludes that, 
rather than being viewed as retaining significance independent of the 
expectations test, the protected areas test should instead be viewed 
as defining a set of expectations that are safe from governmental 
encroachment because they are reasonable as a matter of law. · 
I. THE NATURE OF THE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY TEST 
In Katz v. United States, the petitioner appealed his conviction for 
transmitting wagering information over the telephone in violation of 
a federal antigambling statute.13 FBI agents, proceeding without a 
search warrant, listened to Katz's end of the conversations by attach-
ing an electronic listening and recording device to the outside of a 
public telephone booth from which Katz had placed his calls. This 
·evidence was admitted at trial over petitioner's objection. The gov-
ernment argued that because the agents had not physically intruded 
into the telephone booth, the FBI's activity did not constitute a 
search and seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment. It 
also contended that a public telephone booth was not a "constitu-
tionally protected area," the traditional formulation used to describe 
those areas protected by the amendment. The Supreme Court re-
13. The current statute is 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (Supp. V 1975). 
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versed Katz's conviction, holding that the fourth amendment "pro-
tects people, not places."14 In his concurring opinion, Justice 
Harlan interpreted this holding to mean that a defendant will receive 
fourth amendment protection only if he has a ·"reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy."15 He explained the "reasonable expectation of 
privacy" test as follows: "[T]here is a two-fold requirement, first 
that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of 
privacy, and, second, that the expectation be one that society is pre-
pared to recognize as 'reasonable.' "16 
As this section of the Note indicates, each element of Justice 
Harlan's test, if taken to its logical extreme, might eliminate the right 
to have expectations of freedom from governmental intrusion, 
thereby nullifying the safeguards of the fourth amendment. Al-
though presumably courts would never consciously manipulate the 
expectations test to reach such a restrictive result, they might inad-
vertently come to conclusions at odds with the basic purposes of the 
fourth amendment if the elements of the expectations test are unre-
fined or imprecise. This section of the Note, therefore, scrutinizes 
on several levels the precision of the expectation of privacy standard. 
A. The Actual Expectation Requirement 
1. The Right To Have Expectations: Governmental 
Manipulation of Expectations 
A major difficulty with the threshold requirement that a defen-
dant have an actual expectation of privacy stems from the possibility 
that the government might. reduce--or even make it impossible to 
have-such expectations simply by announcing prior to initiating any 
investigation that it intends to conduct searches. If the right of 
privacy is only as great as the expectation of privacy, then the gov-
ernment can vitiate the right simply by taking away all such expec-
tations. 
It appears that the Court in Katz began to recognize this diffi-
culty, for it stated that people are entitled to know that they are 
protected from unreasonal;,le searches and seizures.17 Yet, by 
defining "unreasonableness" in terms of what a person knows-since 
expectations are based on knowledge or belief-the Court ultimately 
failed to recognize any such entitlement. If the government can 
condition citizens to expect that certain intrusive searches and 
seizures will occur, then those searches and seizures, by definition, 
14. 389 U.S. at 351. 
15. 389 U.S. at 360. 
16. 389 U.S. at 361 (emphasis added). 
17. "Wherever a man may be, he is entitled to know that he will remain free 
from unreasonable searches and seizures." 389 U.S. at 359. 
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would not be unreasonable. This analysis suggests that, by manipu-
lating actual, subjective expectations of privacy, the government could 
determine whether a particular search and seizure is unreasonable. 
Professor Amsterdam emphasizes this criticism of Katz by posing an 
Orwellian hypothetical in which the government flashes messages on 
television informing its citizens that they are subject to constant sur-
veillance-in such a situation, no one can be said to possess an actual 
expectation of privacy.18 Placing this amount of power in the hands 
of the government is clearly inconsistent with the fourth amend-
ment's purpose of circumscribing the ability of the government to 
intrude into people's lives. 
A test based on actual expectations not only allows the govern-
ment to determine the reasonableness of its own agents' searches and 
seizures but also makes it impossible to evaluate the constitutionality 
of laws that authorize such conduct. Suppose, for example, that a 
statute were enacted requiring occupants of automobiles on toll high-
ways to submit to extensive searches of the vehicles, their persons, 
and their luggage at selected toll booths. The statute is so well pub-
licized that no one can actually expect to travel on a toll road with-
out being thoroughly searched. If the "unreasonableness" of a 
search is defihed in terms of actual expectations, then the searches 
allowed by the statute cannot be said to be unreasonable. Therefore, 
the statute itself, let alone -particular searches conducted pursuant to 
it, cannot be held invalid on fourth amendment grounds. 
Although no case has yet involved a breach of fourth amend-
ment rights as blatant as that in either the Amsterdam or the toll road 
hypothetical, in some cases it has been argued, occasionally success-
fully, that the fourth amendment does not protect a citizen when the 
government has given advance notice of the investigative activity. 
One category of advance-notice cases presents the issue of whether 
ithe existence of prior frequent searches vitiates expectations of pri-
vacy with respect to later, similar searches. In People v. Superior 
Court19 (hereinafter cited as Stroud, the name of the real party in 
interest), police officers discovered stolen automobile parts in the 
backyard of the defendant's home while circling over the area in 
a helicopter. In rejecting the defendant's contention that he had 
been subjected to an unreasonable search and seizure, the court 
noted that police helicopters had routinely patrolled the area "for 
18. Amsterdam, supra note 6, at 384. The outcome of the application of the 
actual expectation criterion to this extreme situation leads to the conclusion that the 
phrase "reasonable expectation of privacy" makes sense only if it is a label for a re-
sult rather than a test by which a result is reached. Thus, Professor Amsterdam sug-
gests that Katz and the fourth amendment be analyzed in terms of what citizens 
should demand from their government, rather than in terms of what they actually 
expect. Id. at 385. 
19. 37 Cal. App. 3d 836, 112 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1974). 
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some time."20 Accordingly, it ostensibly concluded that the defen-
dant must have been cognizant of the patrols and therefore _could not 
have had an expectation of privacy. 21 This analysis, of course, 
would support results in the Amsterdam and toll road hypotheticals 
that would seriously erode fourth amendment protection. A better 
approach is found in United States v. Davis,22 where an airport search 
of the defendant's carry-on briefcase revealed a concealed gun. The 
court rejected the government's argument that the defendant could 
not have had a reasonable expectation of privacy. In adding that the· 
government could not, for example, avoid the restrictions of the. fourth 
amendment simply by notifying the public that all telephone lines 
would be tapped or that all homes would be searched, 23 the Davis 
court apparently recognized, as the Stroud court did not, that the 
amendment protects the right to have expectations of privacy. 
A second category of advance-notice cases involves situations in 
which the search in question was conducted pursuant to a regulation, 
a contractual provision, or a posted notice specifically brought to the 
attention of the defendant. In Commonwealth v. McCloskey,24 law 
enforcement officers, a~companied by university officials, searched 
a student's dormitory room and discovered marijuana. The univer-
sity dormitory contract, which the defendant had signed, provided 
that the university reserved the right to inspect the room "under the 
regular procedures of the University" and that the defendant granted 
permission for such inspections.25 The court rejected the govern-
ment's contention that under these circumstances the defendant 
could not have had a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding his 
room. Analogizing a dormitory room to an apartment or hotel room, 
the court concluded that, even though -the university had a right to 
check the room for damages and for violation of safety regulations, 
the defendant was still entitled to have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy regarding the room. 26 Furthermore, the court held that the 
defendant's contractual undertaking did not evidence his consent to 
20. 37 Cal. App. 3d at 839, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 765. 
21. 37 Cal. App. 3d at 839, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 765. Without questioning the de-
fendant's assertion that he had an actual expectation of privacy, the court said that 
he could not have had a reasonable expectation of privacy. That is, even if the fre-
quent aerial observations had not succeeded in altering the defendant's actual expecta-
tion, they had altered the reasonableness of his expectation. 
22. 482 F.2d 893 (8th Cir. 1973). 
23. 482 F.2d at 905. 
24. 217 Pa. Super. Ct. 432, 272 A.2d 271 (1970). 
25. 217 Pa. Super. Ct. at 438, 272 A.2d at 274-75 (Wright, P.J., dissenting). 
26. 217 Pa. Super. Ct. at 436, 272 A.2d at 273. The court's statement here is 
significant in light of this Note's, position that an expectations analysis of the fourth 
amendment is on the right track only if courts recognize the distinction between hav-
ing an expectation and having the right to have an expectation. Accord, Piazzola 
v. Watkins, 442 F:2d 284 (5th Cir. 1971). See text at notes 53-55 infra. 
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the police search or his authorization of the university to consent to 
such searches on his behalf. 27 
In other contexts, however, courts have accepted the argument 
that fourth amendment protection may be defeated by explicit reser-
vation of the right to search. Wilson v. Commonwealth28 upheld 
the validity of a police department's search of the locker of a former 
member of the department. The defendant knew that the depart-
ment kept keys to all lockers and asserted the right to search them 
at any time. In State v. Bryant, 29 a department store employee and 
a police officer observed homosexual activities by positioning them-
selves over a ventilator in the ceiling above a department store rest-
room. Although the court held that this search was invalid under 
Katz, it indicated that the store could have prevented an expectation 
of privacy, and thus could have validly undertaken the search, if signs 
had been posted warning anyone using the facilities that he was apt 
to be under surveillance. so 
The approach used in Wilson and Bryant, like that used in 
Stroud, is troublesome. By simply concluding that advance notice 
can vitiate expectations of privacy, these courts provide no principled 
method for distinguishing the Amsterdam and toll road hypotheticals. 
Although there may be ways to distinguish the factual settings in Wil-
son and Bryant from the facts of each of these hypotheticals,81 such 
efforts fail to come to grips with the basic weakness of an actual ex-
pectations standard: the inability of the test to distinguish situations 
in which a reduction in actual expectations of privacy is justified from 
those situations in which it is not. 
A third category of advance-notice cases involves situations in 
which the defendant has a special status that in effect gives him 
27. 217 Pa. Super. Ct. at 436,272 A.2d at 273. 
The law enforcement officers in McCloskey, unlike those in Katz, had a search 
warrant. The fourth amendment problem arose because they entered defendant's 
room without announcing their identity and purpose. 217 Pa. Super. Ct. at 434, 272 
A.2d at 272. Holding that the amendment's prohibition against entering private 
premises without such notice, in the absence of exigent circumstances, applied to dor-
mitory rooms, the court found it unnecessary to determine whether the warrant was 
valid. 217 Pa. Super. Ct. at 437, 272 A.2d at 274. 
28. 475 S.W.2d 895 (Ky. 1971). 
29. 287 Minn. 205, 177 N.W.2d 800 (1970). 
30. 287 Minn. at 211, 177 N.W.2d at 804. For a discussion of this case and 
other related cases, see 55 MINN. L. RBv. 1255 (1971 ). 
31. This Note argues that property interests should constitute the basis for a mini-
mum content of fourth amendment protection. See text at notes 126-33 infra, How-
ever, the argument that Bryant and Wilson can be justified on the basis of the ab-
sence of property interests-that the defendants were not protect~d because they did 
not have property interests in the areas searched-suggests that such interests would 
constitute a maximum content for fourth amendment protection, This test would 
severely limit the scope of fourth amendment protection and, in addition, would be 
extremely difficult to apply in cases in which there are divided property interests. 
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prior notice that he is subject to warrantless searches, thereby re-
ducing his expectation of privacy. This notion of special status has 
appeared in cases involving probationers and parolees, where courts 
have viewed the peculiar status of the defendant as giving the gov-
ernment an extraordinary interest in supervising his · activities. 
Courts have held that this interest can justify warrantless searches 
that would not have been allowed in the absence· of the individual's 
special status. For example, in People v. Mason32 the Supreme 
Court of California upheld the constitutionality of the terms of the 
defendant's probation, which required him to submit to a warrantless 
search by the police at any time and place. The court indicated that 
the defendant's special status entitled him to only a "reduced expec-
tation of privacy."33 
Although the rationale underlying Mason is not easily discerned, 
the court might have viewed probation as a privilege that must be 
accepted on whatever terms it is offered. The court · did speak in 
terms of consent, 34 which suggests that it might have thought that 
the defendant was not entitled to expect privacy because he had 
acquiesced in the terms of his probation. If Mason is based upon 
the distinction between a privilege and a right, the correctness of 
the result could be challenged. The right-privilege distinction has 
been significantly eroded in other areas of constitutional law,35 and 
it is questionable whether this is a tenable basis for determining· 
whether one is entitled to expect privacy. 
Instead of justifying the results in this category of cases on the 
notion that probation is a privilege for which the right to expect pri-
vacy must be traded, it is better to explain them on the ground· that 
the right to expect privacy must be given less weight when the par-
ticular defendant can be identified as being peculiarly dangerous to 
society. When such an individual was convicted and sentenced to 
serve time in prison, the judicial process determined -that the defend-
ant's activity so threatened society that he had forfeited his liberty. 
Presumably society can justify releasing a dangerous prisoner on pro-
bation only if it has the right to supervise him without obtaining a 
warrant. Thus, the rationale underlying cases such as Mason ap-
pears to embody a balancing process: the interest in protecting 
32. 5 Cal. 3d 759, 488 P.2d 630, 97 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 
1016 (1972). 
33. 5 Cal. 3d at 764, 488 P.2d at 633, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 305. 
34. For a more detailed discussion of the role of consent in advance-notice cases, 
see text at notes 46-63 infra. 
35. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare); Pickering v. 
Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (public employment). See generally Van 
Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 
HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968). 
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society from the defendant is weighed against the interest of the de-
fendant in his own privacy. Greater weight attaches to the former 
interest if there is a particular reason to suppose that the defendant 
may be dangerous to society. In Mason and similar cases, this par-
ticular reason is found in the defendant's special status as one who 
has been convicted of a crime. 
An example of the balancing approach is found in Latta v. Fitz-
harris, 36 which upheld a warrantless search of a parolee's house by 
parole officers. In that case, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that, since a 
parolee is subject to restrictions not applicable to the population as 
a whole, his right to an expectation of privacy is reduced. 37 To ex-
plain why this reduction in expectations is justified, the court analo-
gized the search of a parolee to an administrative search. It cited 
United States v. Biswe/l,38 where the Supreme Court upheld a warrant-
less search of a pawnshop operator's locked gun storeroom pursuant to 
the Gun Control Act of 1968.39 In Biswell, the Court stated that 
inspections to check compliance with the Gun Control Act did not 
infringe the gun dealer's justifiable expectations of privacy. Accord-
ing to the Court in Biswell, when a dealer chooses to engage in a 
pervasively regulated business and accepts a federal license, he does 
so with the knowledge that his business records, firearms, and am-
munition will be subject to inspection. 40 The Ninth Circuit in Latta, 
after analogizing Biswell's status as a licensee of a regulated business 
to Latta's status as a parolee, found that in both situations the indi-
vidual's expectation of privacy is justifiably reduced.41 
Thus, it appears that the special-status cases ultimately rely 
upon the "balancing" approach typically used in the administrative 
search cases:42 the defendant's interest in freedom from govern-
mental intrusion is balanced against the interest of society in con-
ducting searches for the public health, safety, and welfare. Of 
course, searches of probationers and parolees, like administrative 
searches, involve an invasion of privacy.43 The warrant requirement 
36. S21 F.2d 246 (9th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897 (197S), dis-
cussed in 60 MINN, L. REv. 805 (1976). 
37. 521 F.2d at 250. However, in United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F. 
2d 259 (9th Cir. 1975) (en bane), which was decided on the same day as Latta, 
the same court invalidated a warrantless search of a parolee's house conducted by 
law enforcement officers rather than by parole officers. 
38. 406 U.S. 311 (1972). 
39. 18 u.s.c. § 923(g) (1970). 
40. 406 U.S. at 316. 
41. 521 F.2d at 251. 
42. See note 43 infra. 
43. In Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), and See v. City of 
Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), the Court held that regulatory inspections for compli-
ance with municipal codes are "searches" within the meaning of the fourth amend-
ment and thus are subject to its warrant requirement. In order to obtain a warrant, 
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of the fourth amendment was designed to ensure that such searches 
do not occur without probable cause. In administrative search cases 
like Biswell, courts have concluded, after balancing the relevant 
interests, that warrantless administrative searches for limited purposes 
do not constitute invasions of privacy that the fourth amendment 
was designed to prevent. Hence, in these cases the government 
can legitimately reduce the actual expectations of privacy. 
The balancing approach appears to be operative in the special-
status cases as well. The search of a probationer or parolee is less 
arbitrary than the search of a criminal suspect because the special 
status of the probationer or parolee identifies him as someone in 
whom the government has a particularized interest that is stronger 
than the general state interest in preventing crime. After balancing 
this particularized interest against the individual's privacy interest, 
courts have determined that warrantless searches of these special 
classes of individuals do not constitute invasions prohibited by the 
fourth amendment, and thus the government may properly reduce the 
actual privacy expectations held by such persons. 
Although the courts have devised an appropriate rationale to 
support the reduction in expectations of privacy found in the special-
status cases, they have not developed adequate theories to justify re-
ducing these expectations in two other types of advance-notice cases 
-those involving frequent uses of an investigative technique and 
however, the police need not demonstrate the existence of probable cause to believe 
that the conditions of a particular building violate the code; rather, they need show 
only probable cause to believe that a code violation exists somewhere within the area 
in which that building is located. In such cases the determination that probable 
cause exists is made by balancing the government's need to inspect with the invasion 
of the individual's privacy. Thus, although the probable cause requirement for ob-
taining a warrant for an administrative search is less particularized than that for ob-
taining a warrant for a search for evidence of a crime, the Court was still guarding 
against arbitrary invasions of privacy by requiring that a warrant be obtained. , For 
a discussion of the balancing approach employed in these cases, see United States 
v. White, 401 U.S. 745,782 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
In See the Court cautioned- that it did not question commonly accepted regula-
tory techniques such as licensing programs. that require inspections prior to operating 
a business or marketing a product, and it stated that any constitutional challenge to 
such programs could be resolved only on a case-by-case basis. 387 U.S. at 546. 
Thus, the Court left itself the option of limiting the Camara-See warrant require-
ment in the future. In Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 
(1970), and United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972), the Court exercised this 
option and provided lower courts with a vehicle for further limiting the requirement. 
In Colonnade, the Court granted a motion to suppress evidence obtained by a war-
rantless search of the locked storeroom of a licensed liquor dealer on the ground that 
the imposition of a fine was the exclusive sanction under the statute authorizing in-
spection. But the Court implied that Congress could have passed a valid statute au-
thorizing warrantless searches of licensed liquor establishments. See 397 U.S. at 76-
77. 
In Biswell, the Court distinguished See, stating that periodic inspection sufficed 
in that case, and thus requiring a warrant would involve little threat to the effective-
ness of the inspection system. In Biswell, however, unannounced and perhaps fre-
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those involving a regulation or posted notice. 44 Upholding warrant-
less searches in these cases without justifying the concomitant reduc-
tion in expectations of privacy appears to weaken the content of the 
fourth amendment. If expectations can be eliminated simply 
through advance notice of the search, then the searches in the 
Amsterdam and toll road hypotheticals could be deemed consistent 
with the fourth amendment. So long as any person may be deprived 
of his actual expectations of privacy, there is no warrantless govern-
mental search that falls within the category of "unreasonable" 
searches prohibited by the fourth amendment. 
The above analysis suggests that some situations deserve fourth 
amendment protection notwithstanding the absence of an actual ex-
pectation of privacy.45 As a matter of logic as well as policy, any 
test of what constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure must go 
further than merely recognizing the· rights of individuals only when 
they possess actual expectations of privacy. Such a test must recog-
nize the more basic right to have expectations of privacy. The test 
must recognize that the advance notice that certain searches will be 
conducted is an intrusion in itself. Even though such an announce-
ment may reduce actual expectations, it will not validate the search, 
since the notice itself violates the individual's right to have expecta-
tions of privacy. 
2. Actual Expectations and Consent 
Several courts have decided advance-notice cases on the theory 
quent inspections were essential to detect and to deter violations of the Gun Control 
Act. After balancing the relevant interests, the Court determined that regulatory 
inspections that further urgent federal interests and do not seriously threaten privacy 
may proceed without a warrant where specifically authorized by statute. 406 U.S. 
at 317. 
This Term the Supreme Court will reconsider the question of the constitutionality 
of warrantless administrative searches in Barlow's, Inc. v. Usery, 424 F. Supp. 437 
(D. Idaho 1976), prob. juris. noted sub nom. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 430 U.S. 
964 ('1977). 
44. An acute example of the failure to provide a justification for reducing actual 
expectations is United States v. Bynum, 485 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated and re-
manded, 417 U.S. 903 (1974), prior judgment reinstated, 513 F.2d 533, cert. denied, 
423 U.S. 952 (1975). In that case, the defendant was aware, through a "contact" 
in the telephone company, that his telephone was being tapped. Given his awareness, 
the court found it inconsistent for him to advert to an expectation of privacy. But 
since no justification was offered for tapping his phone, no justification was offered 
for the reduction in expectation of privacy. 
45. It might be argued that one who has no actual expectation of privacy regard-
ing a certain place can take precautions to ensure that he will not be observed con-
ducting an illegal activity there: even though he cannot prevent the manipulation 
of his expectations, he can prevent the observation of incriminating activity. The 
response to this argument is that it is itself an intrusion for the government to create 
the necessity of taking such precautions. For further discussion of precautions, see 
text at notes 64-11 infra. 
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that, by having advance knowledge that a search would be con-
ducted, the defendant implicitly consented to be searched. In 
United States v. Davis,46 for example, the court rejected the govern-
ment's argument that the frequency of airport searches had negated 
any expectation of privacy, but it then remanded the case on the 
issue of consent. Because consent is a well-known exception47 to 
the fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches, 
advance-notice cases might be resolved by finding-that the defendant 
consented to the search, eliminating any need to reach the expectations 
issue. Yet, if a defendant can be deemed to' have consented to any 
search of which he had some sort of advance notice, then the result 
will be the same as if the court had decided . that the government 
can avoid the fourth amendment's requirements by controlling his 
expectations. 
Although the concepts of consent and expectation can both be 
used to describe the scope of the fourth amendment, 48 the two con-
cepts are not functionally identical. Giving consent, unlike having 
an expectation, requires knowing and voluntary conduct. In 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,49 the Supreme Court explained the 
voluntariness requirement of a "consent search" as follows: 
[W]hen the subject of a search is not in custody and the State at-
tempts to justify a search on the basis of his consent, the Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendments require that it demonstrate that the 
consent was in fact voluntarily given, and not the result of duress 
or coercion, express or implied. Voluntariness is a question of fact 
to be determined from all the circumstances.50 
At times it is difficult to determine whether the consent to· a 
given search is voluntary.51 for example, it is questionable whether 
voluntariness exists if one must accede to a search of his ,,luggage 
in order to board an airplane. Although an individual might avoid 
the requisite search by using another mode of transportation, this al-
ternative may not be possible or practical. 
46. 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973). 
47. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973). 
48. As seen earlier, the concept of expectation, which is a function of belief or 
knowledge, is used to describe the privacy interests protected by the fourth amend-
ment. The scope of the belief or knowledge determines the scope of fourth amends 
ment protection. ·See text at note 17 supra. Similarly, "the constitutional protection 
against unreasonable search or seizure widens or narrows, depending on the difficulty 
or ease with which the prosecution can establish that the defendant has 'consented' 
to what would otherwise be an unconstitutional invasion of his privacy." Y. KAMI· 
SAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 339 (4th ed. 1974). 
49. 412 U.S. 218 (1973). 
50. 412 U.S. at 248-49. 
51. For a discussion of some of the complexities of the concept of consent in 
another context, see Note, Consent in Criminal Law: Violence in Sports, 15 MICH. 
L. REV. 148 (1976). 
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These difficulties with the consent concept are apparent in the 
dormitory cases discussed earlier, 52 where university officials by 
regulation or dormitory contract provision had reserved the right to 
enter and search rooms "for inspection purposes." In Piazza/a v. 
Wat kins, 53 the court rejected the government's argument that, because 
the students were aware of the regulation, they had consented to a 
search by law enforcement officers for the purpose of obtaining evi-
dence for a criminal prosecution. The court concluded that the stu-
dents had "voluntarily" consented to being searched for limited 
inspection purposes only. Similarly, in Commonwealth v. McClos-
key,54 the court distinguished consent to a search by university offi-
cials from consent to a search by the police. Disagreeing with the 
government's argument that the student had consented to the latter, 
the court also rejected the argument that he had given the university 
the authority to consent to the police search. 511 
Cases such as Piazzola and M cC/oskey recognize that it is 
possible to consent to a search for a limited purpose without alto-
gether relinquishing the right to fourth amendment protection. In 
such cases it may be said that the protection afforded the defendant 
is diminished only to the extent that he has voluntarily carved out 
an exception to the warrant requirement.116 
But there are other cases that have failed to recognize that, when 
an individual consents to searches of part or all of his premises by 
certain persons for specified p1,J.Ip0ses, the individual waives his ex-
pectations of privacy only in regard to those areas, people, and pur-
poses. 57 Katz failed to address whether such explicit distinctions can 
be drawn upon the scope of the defendant's consent, stating only 
that "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his 
own home or office, is not the subject of Fourth Amendment protec-
tion . . . . But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an 
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."58 
52. See notes 24-27 supra and accompanying text. 
53. 442 F.2d 284, 289 (5th Cir. 1971). 
54. 217 Pa. Super. Ct. 432, 272 A.2d 271 (1970). 
55. 217 Pa. Super. Ct. at 436, 272 A.2d at 273. A similar argument was re• 
jected in Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964), where the government had con-
tended that defendant's consent to a hotel clerk entering the defendant's room gave 
the clerk apparent authority to consent to police entry of the room. 
56. United States v. Dichiarinte, 445 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1971), illustrates this 
point. In that case, the defendant told the police that they could search his house 
for narcotics. In the course of the search, the police opened and examined sealed 
private papers. The court concluded that this was not within the scope of the consent 
and that the search was therefore invalid with respect to the papers. 
51. Cf. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973). In that case, the defendant 
had released her business records to her tax accountant. The Court found that by 
relinquishing her expectation of privacy as to the accountant, she had likewise re. 
linquished any such expectation as to the Internal Revenue Service. 
58. 389 U.S. at 351-52 (citations omitted). 
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Nevertheless, the expectation of privacy test developed in that case 
certainly is not inconsistent with differentiating between activities 
and areas about which an individual has yield.ed his expectation and 
those about which he has not. 
In another class of decisions-the "plain view" cases-the issue 
is whether the defendant has revealed his activities in such a way 
that he has waived all expectation of privacy. If an individual ex-
poses his activities to the possibility of public view, then it follows 
that he is no longer entitled ·to expect those activities to be private-
in effect, he has simply surrendered his interest in privacy by con-
senting to public observation of his conduct. Thus, if a police officer 
views activities of the defendant in plain view from a place in which 
he has a tight to be, the defendant cannot claim that he enjoyed a 
reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to those activities. 59 
As stated by Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion in Katz, "ob-
jects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the 'plain view' of 
outsiders are not !protected' because no intention to keep them to 
himself has been exhibited."60 
In another class of cases, the individual has yielded certain 
expectations of privacy but has not surrendered them entirely. As 
noted earlier, 61 an individual may allow a particularized segment of 
the population to view his activities for a limited purpose while re-
taining his expectations of privacy with respect to others. For 
example, suppose that an individual invites his neighbors to his back-
yard-which is hidden from public view-to engage in an illegal 
activity. Clearly the individual does not expect to maintain privacy 
from those whom he invites. It does not necessarily follow, 
however, that the individual has voluntarily surrendered his expec-
tations of privacy regarding the public or •the police. 62 The 
59. The "plain view" doctrine, as described by the Supreme Court, provides that 
"objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to 
have that view are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence." Harris v. 
United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968) (per curiam). See generally J. ISRAEL & 
W. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN A NUTSHELL 92-93 (2d ed. 1975). 
60. 389 U.S. at 361. 
61. See text at notes 53-58 supra. 
62. In this regard, consider the factual setting of Recznik v. City of Lorain, 393 
U.S. 166 (1968). Petitioner conducted a gambling operation on his own property, 
a:nd large numbers of people entered the apartment to engage in this activity. Police 
officers, ·noting the large number of cars near the apartment, climbed the apartment 
stairs, entered unannounced through the back door, arrested everyone present, and 
seized the gambling devices. The Court held that this entry violated the fourth 
amendment, holding that the large number of people entering and leaving the apart-
ment did not make it a public establishment. It might be said that the petitioner 
surrendered his expectations of privacy only with respect to those that he allowed 
upon his property. Had the gambling activity been in plain view, petitioner would 
have surrendered all his expectations, and the police entry would have been per-
missible. 
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dormitory cases noted earlier are within this category.68 
In summary, the concept of consent is closely linked to the 
actual expectation requirement of the Katz test. By consenting to a 
search, an individual surrenders his expectations of privacy. Simi-
larly, by vountarily exposing his activities to the public, an individual 
consents -to public view of, and hence surrenders his expectations of 
privacy with respect to, those activities. 
B. The Reasonable Expectation Requirement 
Thus far, this Note has suggested ·that, if the expectation of 
privacy test is to provide adequate protection of fourth amendment 
interests, limitations must be placed upon the actual expectation re-
quirement. As this section indicates, these limitations would have 
little significance unless they were complemented with limitations 
o~ the second part of Justice Harlan's test-"that the expectation 
be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable."64 
In determining whether an expectation is reasonable, courts have 
often considered whether the efforts of a defendant to preserve the 
privacy of his activities are reasonably calculated to achieve that re-
sult. The expectation of privacy is considered reasonable only if the 
defendant's efforts to preserve privacy involve the taking of "suffi-
cient" precautions65-if a reasonable person would have preserved his 
privacy by taking precautions that the defendant did not implement, 
then -the defendant's expectation of privacy is not reasonable. Em-
bodied in this approach •to defining the reasonableness of expecta-
tions is the notion that a defendant who has failed to take sufficient 
precautions has assumed the risk that the police will detect his 
activities. 66 
The above result is consistent with the misplaced confidence cases. See note 66 
infra and accompanying text. 
63. See text at notes 53-55 supra. 
64. It is elementary that the term "reasonableness," as used in tort law, includes 
the concept of foreseeability. As applied to the expectation of privacy test, however, 
the term refers to the justifiability of the expectation. The following example illus-
trates the distinction between these concepts. Although it may be improbable, based 
on past experience, that a police officer with a· flashlight will be strolling through 
a desolate comer of Central Park in the middle of the night, the expectation of pri• 
vacy of narcotics peddlers who rely on this improbability by conducting an illegal 
transaction in that desolate comer is not justifiable. One commentator has asserted 
that, in such situations, justifiability should be determined by factors such as the na-
ture of the intended area of private control, the kind of information sought to be 
preserved as private, and the means of governmental intrusion, as well as by fore• 
seeability of intrusion. See Note, 43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 968, supra note 6, at 982-86, 
It should be noted that Katz speaks in terms of justifiability, 389 U.S. at 353, as 
does United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745,752 (1971). 
65. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hemley, 216 Pa. Super. Ct. 177, 263 A.2d 904 
(1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 914 0971), discussed in text at note 67 infra. 
66. This notion of assumption of risk also underlies the pre-Katz misplaced con-
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An inquiry that focuses on precautions provides an objective 
means of determining whether a defendant has manifested an inten-
tion to keep his activities to himself. Even so, however, such an 
inquiry does not advance the analysis of whether fourth amendment 
protection should be granted in a given case. By shifting the 
question of whether a search is reasonable from a consideration of ex-
pectations to a consideration of precautions, courts are simply sub-
stituting one objective criterion for another, with no resulting refine-
ment qf the "reasonableness" concept. If taking precautions against 
particular kinds of intrusions is either unduly burdensome to the de-
fendant or wholly inconsistent with basic notions of individual 
autonomy, it cannot be said that his failure to take the precaution 
is unreasonable and that as a result he has no reasonable expectation 
of privacy. In short, the fourth amendment only insists that an in-
dividual take reasonable precautions; simply insisting on precautions 
does not advance the analysis of what is reasonable. 
An example of how an analysis that focuses on precautions can be 
misapplied is found in Commonwealth v. Hernley. 67 FBI agenrts made 
warrantless nocturnal observations with binoculars through the win-
dows of the defendant's print shop while standing on a four-foot ladder 
situated on abutting railroad tracks thirty-five feet from the shop. The 
height of the shop's windowsills exceeded the height -of an average 
man, and thus no one who was standing on the ground outside the 
building could have observed activities within the shop. Even so, 
the court refused to find an unreasonable search within the meaning 
of the fourth amendment, determining that the defendant's expecta-
tion was not reasonable because he could have curtained his 
windows. 68 Even though the CQUrt conceded that the defendant had 
an actual expectation of privacy, it deemed this expectation un-
fidence cases. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966); Lewis v. United 
States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963); On Lee 
v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952). In these cases, the defendants voluntarily 
reposed confidence in, and exposed their illegal activities to, persons who, unknown 
to the defendants, were either undercover agents or informants. The Court held in 
each case that this type of governmental intrusion is not a "search" within the mean-
ing of the fourth amendment. 
Katz has not changed the manner in which the Court has treated this line of 
cases. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971). In concluding that the 
defendant had assumed the risk, the Court used a balancing approach: the govern-
ment's interest in using informants is balanced with the defendlfnt's interest in having 
confidants whom he -can trust. If the balance is struck on the side of the interest 
in using informants, the Court concludes that the defendant has assumed the risk. 
-See 401 U.S. at 768 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
67. 216 Pa. Super. Ct. 177, 263 A.2d 904 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 914 
(1971). 
68. 216 Pa. Super. Ct. at 181-82, 263 A.2d at 907. · Another case explained the 
precautions analysis as follows: "It is the duty of a policeman to investigate, and we 
cannot say that . . . the Fourth Amendment itself draws the blinds the occupant 
could have drawn but did not." United States v. Fisch, 474 F.2d 1071, 1078 n.15 
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reasonable since he had failed to guard against the possibility that 
law enforcement officers might look through his windows with the 
assistance of a ladder and binoculars. Clearly the court failed to 
evaluate the reasonableness of possible precautions in light of the 
nature of the intrusion. As one writer has argued, this sort of 
reasoning, if taken to its logical extreme, would afford fourth amend-
ment protection only to those who live within windowless, sound-
proof forts. 69 
It thus seems clear that the reasonableness of requiring an 
individual to take a given precaution in order to receive fourth 
amendment protection should depend upon the circumstances of the 
particular situation. United States v. Holmes70 illustrates this point. 
In that case, narcotics agents found and seized marijuana on the de-
fendants'· farm. The government argued that the defendants had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy because they had failed to post 
"no trespassing" signs, erect fences, or undertake other measures 
to conceal the marijuana from passersby.71 The Fifth Circuit re-
jected this argument, stating that it ignored the- character of the 
farm property. The court reasoned ithat, although a homeowner in 
a densely populated urban area might have to take greater pre-
cautions to protect his activity from detection by a casual passerby, 
a resident of a rural area whose property is surrounded by a dense 
growth "need not anticipate"72 that government agents might crawl 
through the underbrush and therefore need not post signs warning 
such agents to stay away. Holmes thus recognized that only reason-
able precautions should be demanded and that what is reasonable 
must be assessed in light of the character of the area being 
searched. 73 
Justice Harlan, in his dissent in United States v. White,74 recog-
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 921 (1973), quoting State v. Smith, 37 N.J. 481, 
496, 181 A.2d 161, 769 (1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 835 (1963). 
69. Note, 23 CLEv~ ST. L. REV. 63, supra note 6, at 72. Compare the view of 
Judge J. Skelly Wright: 
Is it not important to our American way of life that when a citizen does as much 
as ordinary care requires to shield his sanctuary from strangers his constitutional 
right to maintain his privacy should not be made to depend upon the resources 
of skillful peepers and eavesdroppers who can always find ways to intrude? 
United States v. Wright, 449 F.2d 1355, 1368 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 
U.S. 947 (1972) (dissenting opinion). 
70. 521 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1975), affd. in part and revd. in part on rehearing, 
531 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. •1976) (per curiam). 
71. 521 F.2d at 869-70. 
72. 521 F.2d at 870. 
73. Yet, the reference to what the homeowner "need not anticipate" sounds like 
nothing more than a reference to what he should reasonably expect. If the court 
is'determining the necessity for taking precautions by reference to reasonable expecta-
tions, then the analysis is circular. 
74. 401 U.S. 145 (1971). 
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nized the weakness of an inflexible expectation of privacy test. He 
argued that proper an~ysis must go beyond the search for subjective 
expectation and for assumption of risk through the failure to take 
precautions, because expectations and the risks assumed are largely 
reflections of laws that embody the customs and values of the past 
and present. 75 Therefore, to determine whether a warrant should 
be required, Justice Harlan suggested that the nature of a particular 
police practice and its probable impact on an individual's sense of 
security be balanced against the utility of the practice as a law en-
forcement technique.76 Justice Harlan's point is that the fourth 
amendment entitles persons to have certain minimum expectations 
of privacy. If Katz is applied without this notion in mind, then the 
expectation of privacy test might be used to undercut the very 
essence of the right of privacy that it purports to protect. 77 
II. THE ROLE OF CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED 
AREAS AFTER Katz 
Thus far this Note has suggested that an expectations analysis 
ca.1not adequately protect fourth amendment interests unless the test 
ace ounts for the government's ability to manipulate actual expecta-
tio as and unless courts, when determining the reasonableness of the 
expectation, insist only upon reasonable precautions. In essence, 
courts must recognize that the core of the fourth amendment con-
tains a minimum set of expectations to which all persons are entitled. 
It is to two crucial aspects of this analysis-the limits of this mini-
. mum set of expectations and the weight accorded the privacy inter~t 
in situations where other factors demand recognition-that this 
Note now turns. 
A. Privacy Versus Property Interests: The 
lmplicati(!ns of Kara 
Katz rejected the view ·that the validity of a warrantless search 
can be determined by referring to the traditional "constitutionally 
protected area" standard,78 instead holding that the fourth amend-
ment "protects people, not places. "79 This approach generated con-
75. 401 U.S. at 786. Justice Douglas made a similar point in his dissent to denial 
of certiorari in United States v. Williamson, 405 U.S. 1026, 1029 (1972): "Ob-
viously citizens must bear only those threats to privacy which we decide to impose." 
76. 401 U.S. at 786. 
77. Justice Douglas has argued that the very essence of the right of privacy is 
the right of the individual to choose whether to reveal his possessions to the- police. 
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 323-25 (1967) (dissenting opinion). 
One commentator has defined privacy as the control we have over information 
about ourselves. Fried, Privacy, 11 YALE L.J. 475, 482 (1968). 
78. 389 U.S. at 350-51. 
79. 389 U.S. at 351. 
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fusion80 about the degree of protection afforded certain areas-such 
as the home-traditionally thought to be at the core of the amend-
ment. 81 Moreover, the extent to which property concepts would 
continue to have vitality was not clear, for, as Justice Harl~n noted 
in his concurring opinion, the key question is what protection the 
fourth amendment affords people, and generally the answer to that 
question requires reference to a place. 82 
The difference between the constitutionally protected areas 
standard and the reasonable expectation of privacy standard can be 
characterized as a dichotomy between property interests and privacy 
interests. 83 Since the Katz decision expresses a clear preference for 
privacy interest analysis over property interest analysis, 84 the perti-
nent question after Katz is what role, if any, property interests play 
in defining fourth amendment protection. 
One possible interpretation is that the Katz expectations test has 
totally displaced the protected areas standard. Under this view, the 
traditional notion that certain areas are protected retains vitality only 
insofar as expectations of privacy in those areas are deemed reason-
able. Property interests are, in effect, "incorporated" into the ex-
pectations test. 85 A second possible interpretation is that the 
protected areas standard retains independent significance. Under 
this view, the expectations test supplements the protected areas test 
80. See, e.g., United States v. Fisch, 474 F.2d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 
412 U.S. 921 (1973): "[Katz] expresses little more than a rejection of the trespass 
rule. It does not tell us what people are protected, when they are protected, or why 
they are protected." 
81. See text at notes 100-13 infra. 
82. 389 U.S. at 361. In commenting on Katz's holding that the fourth amend-
ment protects people, not places, one critic stated that 
[t]he only merit in this comment is its brevity. Of course the amendment is for 
the benefit of people, not places. But it may protect peoples' places and proper-
ties-"houses, papers, and effects," in the language of the amendment-even 
when people are not in them or in immediate possession of them, and it may 
protect people themselves-i.e., "persons"-more fully when they are in one 
place than another. 
T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 112-13 (1969). 
83. In Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886), the Supreme Court spoke 
of "the indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private property." 
The contrast in focus between an approach based on property interests and one based 
on privacy interests is discussed in Supreme Court, supra note 3', at 189. 
84. In holding that the constitutionally protected areas doctrine was not con-
trolling in Katz, the Court noted that the premise that property interests control the 
right of the government to search and seize had been discredited. 389 U.S. 347, 353 
(1967) (citing Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967)). 
85. See, e.g., United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1975), affd. in part 
and revd. in part per curiam on rehearing, 537 F.2d 227 (Sth Cir. 1976); United 
States v. Fisch, 474 F.2d 1071 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 921 (1973); United 
States v. Wilson, 472 F.2d 901 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Freeman, 426 F.2d 
1351 (9th Cir. 1970). 
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in situations where the latter does not sufficiently protect the defen-
dant. so . 
The difference between these two interpretations is significant. 
Underlying the view that the expectations standard wholly displaces 
the protected areas test is the assumption that a defendant's expecta-
tion of privacy in a traditionally protected area-such as his horn~ 
is only prima facie reasonable:87 A warrantless search of such an 
area is presumed unreasonable, but this presumption can be rebutted 
with evidence that the defendant had no actual expectation of 
privacy or that, because he failed to take certain precautions, he had 
no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy. But under the 
view that the protected areas test retains independent force, searches 
that do not fall within any of the standard exceptions88 to the fourth 
amendment warrant requirement are per se unreasonable: if a war-
rantless search occurs in a traditionally protected area, evidence re-
garding both actual expectations and precautions is irrelevant in 
determining the reasonableness of the search. Thus, the privacy 
value of a traditionally protected area receives greater recognition 
under the second interpretation than it does under the first. In 
essence, allowing the protected area standard to have independent 
force adds an extra dimension to the expectation of privacy standard 
by protecting the right to have certain expectations. · 
Because the expectations test formulated in Katz does not draw 
distinctions based on property concepts, it might seem inconsistent 
with that case to allow the protected areas test to retain any inde-
pendent force. The language and context of Katz, however, indicate 
that no such inconsistency exists. Katz involved a nontrespassory 
surveillance of a public telephone booth, and it was in that setting 
that the Court concluded that the correct solution of fourth amend-
ment problems is "not necessarily promoted by incantations of the 
phrase 'constitutionally protected area.' "89 The Court went on to 
state that, although the amendment protects individual privacy . . 
86. See, e.g., Fixel v. Wainwright, 492 F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1974); State v. Crea, 
305 Minn. 342, 233 N.W.2d 736 (1975). In Fixel, the Fifth Circuit noted that it 
would have reached the same result under either the constitutionally protected areas 
test or the reasonable expectation of privacy standard. 492 F.2d at 483-84. 
87. As Justice Harlan said in his concurring opinion in Katz, "a man's home is, 
for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy." 389 U.S. at 361. 
88. This qualification is necessary because there are a number of well-known ex-
ceptions to the prohibition against warrantless searches, regardless of where they may 
occur. Among these exceptions are search incident to a lawful arrest (Chime! v. 
California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969)); consent (Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218 
( 1973)); hot pursuit of a fleeing felon (Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967)); 
search to prevent the destruction or removal of evidence (Johnson v. United States, 
333 U.S. 10 (1948) ). 
89. 389 U.S. at 350 (emphasis added). 
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against certain kinds of governmental intrusion, "its protections go 
further, and often have nothing to do with privacy at all."00 
The Court in Katz concluded that the underpinnings of two cases 
that had invoked the constitutionally protected areas test-Olmstead 
v. United States91 and Goldman v. United States92-had been so 
eroded by subsequent decisions that the "trespass" doctrine03 of 
those cases could no longer be regarded as controlling. 94 Yet it is 
one thing to assert that a doctrine is no longer controlling and 
another to contend that it has been entirely displaced.06 Thus, it 
might be the case that the Court merely intended that intrusion into 
a traditionally protected area would no longer be a necessary condi-
tion for invoking fourth amendment protection, rather than intending 
that such intrusion would no longer be a sufficient condition for 
invoking that protection. 
This reading of Katz is supported by other arguments. Katz has 
been characterized as a policy decision designed to expand fourth 
amendment protection to cases in which the government's nontres-
passory intrusion was effectuated by modern technological means.911 
The expectations test was established in Katz simply to cover a con-
tingency that the traditional test could not handle. Furthermore, 
because Katz involved neither a search undertaken by physical in-
trusion nor a search of an area in which the defendant had a property 
interest, -the case can be read as standing for the proposition that prop-
erty concepts are useful in some factual settings but are inconsequen-
90. 389 U.S. at 350 (footnote omitted). The Court added that it had never sug-
gested that the protected areas concept would provide a "talismanic solution to every 
Fourth Amendment problem.'' 389 U.S. at 351 n.9. In this regard, Professor Am-
sterdam has argued that "[a]n opinion which sets aside prior formulas with the ob-
servation that they cannot 'serve as a talismanic solution to every Fourth Amendment 
problem' should hardly be read as intended to replace them with a new talisman.'' 
Amsterdam, supra note 6, at 385. 
91. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
92. 316 U.S. 129 (1942). 
93. The constitutionally protected areas doctrine has also been called the trespass 
doctrine, because in cases such as Olmstead and Goldman, which involved electronic 
eavesdropping committed without trespass into a traditionally protected area, the 
Court found that there had been no search and seizure within the meaning of the 
fourth amendment. See generally J. ISRAEL & W. LAFAVE, supra note 59, at 88, 168. 
94. 389 U.S. at 347. 
95. Olmstead and Goldman were based on the notion that eavesdropping was not 
a search or seizure as well as on the fact that no trespass had been committed. In 
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961), the Court determined that eaves-
dropping could constitute a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment. In 
that case, however, the police had effectuated the eavesdropping by inserting a "spike 
mike" into the party wall between the defendant's house and the house occupied by 
the police, and the Court did not indicate clearly whether this physical penetration 
into the defendant's premises was a fact crucial to its decision. See J. ISRAEL & W. 
LAFAVE, supra note 59, at 170-71. 
96. Note, 9 IND. L. REV. 468, supra note 6, at 475. 
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tial in others. In short, it does not necessarily follow from Katz that 
the values underlying the old protected areas •test were intended to be 
displaced by the new expectations test, and therefore it is not incon-
sistent with that case to allow the constitutionally protected areas test 
to retain independent force. 
Given that both tests can coexist, the question remains whether 
the protected areas test should retain vitality. Katz has been viewed 
as expanding the scope of fourth amendment protection. 97 Yet, if 
Katz renders impotent the protected areas standard and if the .expec-
tations standard is applied without adequate limitations, a defendant 
could receive less protection after Katz than he would have received 
before it. 98 One critic has remarked that, although it may be re-
assuring to be told that one's privacy will receive as much protection 
in a phone booth as in one's home, it.is not so reassuring to realize 
that one's privacy will receive as little protection in one's home as in 
a phone booth. 00 An interpretation of Katz that retains the consti-
tutionally protected areas test as an independent standard would 
provide a more secure safeguard against intrusive government 
searches. Under this view, certain areas-those at the core of the 
fourth amendment-would exist where a person would know that 
he is secure from intrusive governmental activities regardless of the 
.extent to which the government manipulates an individual's expecta-
tions and regardless of the precautions against intrusion that courts 
determine he should have taken. 
B. Defining a Minimum Content of the 
Fourth Amendment 
1. The Home as a Core Value 
The home is an obvious starting point in the search for the mini-
mum content of the fourth amendment, for the word4tg of the amend-
ment makes clear the great emphasis it places upon the right of the 
people to be secure in their houses. On several occasions, the Su-
preme Court has expressly stated that the sanctity of the home is a 
core value of the amendment. In the landmark case of Boyd v. United 
States, 100 the Court said that the fourth amendment serves to protect 
97. Even Professor Amsterdam, who has rather severely criticized the lack of pre-
cision in the Katz opinion, see, e.g., text at note 18 supra, has stated that, "[a]s a 
doctrinal matter, it seems clear that the effect of Katz is to expand rather than gen-
erally to reconstruct the boundaries of fourth amendment protection." Amsterdam, 
supra note 6, at 385. 
98. Professor Amsterdam has recognized this possibility. See Amsterdam, supra 
note 6, at 460 n.349. · 
99. T. TAYLOR, supra note 82, at 114. 
100. 116 l,J.S. 616 (1886). 
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"the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life."101 In 
Silverman v. United States, 102 the Court said that a person's right 
to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion while in his 
own home is at the very core of the fourth amendment.103 Signifi-
cantly, the Court in Silverman acknowledged the sanctity of the 
home even though it rejected the view that fourth amendment rights 
are inevitably defined by technical trespass law.104 Although· Silver-
man was ultimately decided on the ground that the police had made 
a physical invasion of the premises, Katz viewed Silverman as dis-
crediting the trespass doctrine and as providing a precedent for the 
Court's shift in emphasis from property to privacy concepts.105 
The theme of the sanctity of the home has continued in post-
Katz case law, as illustrated by two of the major post-Katz electronic 
surveillance cases. In United States v. United States District 
Court,1° 6 the ·Court stated that its decision in Katz had refused to 
limit the fourth amendment to instances of actual physical trespass, 
although "physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which 
the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed."107 According 
to the Court, the amendment's "broader spirit"108 now shields private 
speech from unreasonable surveillance. Thus, in this opinion the 
Court viewed Katz as expanding the scope of the amendment's pro-
tection rather than simply replacing the standard for measuring its 
scope. 
In Alderman v. United States,109 the Court indicated that it did 
not intend to increase protection of privacy at the expense of protec-
tion of property. In that case, the Court held that a defendant has 
standing to assert a personal fourth amendment defense to a search and 
seizure of conversations that occurred in his house even if he was 
not present or did not participate in them. The Court said that the 
"security of persons and property remains a fundamental value which 
law enforcement officers must respect."110 It rejected the argument 
that a person has no standing to seek to exclude evidence of conver-
sations overheard in his home unless his own conversational privacy 
is invaded; instead the Court concluded that the person may object 
because the conversations were the fruits of an unauthorized search 
101. 116 U.S. at 630. 
102. 365 U.S. 505 (1961). 
103. 365 U.S. at 511. 
104. 365 U.S. at 511. 
105. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. 
106. 407 U.S. 297 (1972). 
107. 407 U.S. at 313. 
108. 407 U.S. at 313. 
109. 394 U.S. 165 (1969). 
110. 394 U.S. at 175. 
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of his house, the privacy nf "which is itself expressly protected by the 
Fourth Amendment."111 Referring to the "express security for the 
home provided by the Fourth Amendment,"112 the Court stated that 
it did not believe "that Katz, by holding that the Fourth Amendment 
protects persons and their private conversations, was intended to 
withdraw any of the protection which the amendment extends to the 
home."113 
In short, it appears that the privacy standard articulated in Katz 
is not inconsistent with defining the protection of the fourth amend-
ment by reference to a place. One area that can be described in 
such geographic terms is the home-and it has been shown that the 
sanctity of the home appears to be at the very core of the fourth 
amendment. To the extent that the home has this protected status, 
the constitutionally protected areas standard and its reliance upon 
property concepts retain vitality after Katz. 
2. The Distinction Between Open Fields and Curtilage 
The continued vitality of the open field-curtilage distinction, 
which was first recognized in pre-Katz cases, also supports the notion 
that property concepts embraced by the constitutionally protected 
areas test retain vitality after Katz. In 1924, the Supreme Court 
held in Hester v. United States114 that the fourth amendment did not 
protect activities or objects in an open field even if a defendant had 
property rights in the field and the government agents who discov-
ered the incriminating evidence had technically committed a trespass 
upon the property. In the interim between Hester and Katz, the 
courts further illuminated the protected areas concept by extending 
the protection of the fourth amendment to the house's curtilage, 
based on the notion that the curtilage was-just as an open field was 
not-an extension of a traditionally protected area, the house.115 
Thus, prior to Katz, actual trespass upon an individual's prop~rty by 
111. 394 U.S. at 117. 
112. 394 U.S. at 179. 
113. 394 U.S. at 180. 
114. 265 U.S. 57 (1924). 
115. See, e.g., Rosencranz v. United States, 356 F.2d 310 (1st Cir. 1966); Walker 
v. United States, 225 F.2d 447 (5th Cir. 1955). One court has defined curtilage 
as including "all buildings in close proximity to a dwelling, which are continually 
used for carrying on domestic employment; or such place as is necessary and con-
venient to a dwelling, and is habitually used for family purposes." United States v. 
Potts, 297 F.2d 68, 69 (6th Cir. 1961). 
In McDowell v. United States, 383 F.2d 599 (8th Cir. 1967), the court refused 
to extend fourth amendment protection to open fields even though the defendant had 
posted "no trespassing" signs. Under the precautions analysis of Katz, it could cer-
tainly be argued that the defendant had manifested a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy. 
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governmental officials was a necessary-but not a sufficient-
condition of fourth amendment protection. 
Although Katz announced that privacy is an appropriate concept 
by which to measure the scope of fourth amendment protection, the 
continued reference in decisions to the distinction between open fields 
and curtilage116 not only suggests the continued vitality of a protected 
areas test but also provides support for the proposition that the home 
and those areas functionally related to it are at the core of the 
amendment. Unfortunately, the coexistence of the open field-
curtilage distinction and the expectation of privacy test has not 
always been harmonious: as the following discussion indicates, the 
two doctrines can lead to disparate results under identical factual 
situations. 
Wattenburg v. United States117 illustrates a situation in which the 
protected areas test and expectation of privacy test reach identical 
results. In that case, government officials entered the defendant's 
land and searched a stockpile of cut trees located thirty-five feet 
from a lodge in which he and a co-defendant resided. The court, 
citing Hester, held that the defendants were protected by the fourth 
amenqment because the stockpile was within the curtilage. 118 The 
court then stated that "a more appropriate test [than the one based 
on curtilage] in determining if a search and seizure adjacent to a 
house .is. constitutionally forbidden is whether it constitutes an intru-
sion upon what the resident seeks to preserve as private even in an 
area which, although adjacent to his home, is accessible to the pub-
lic."119 Finally, the court concluded that the search of the stockpile 
was illegal under this test as well.120 W attenburg thus demonstrates 
that when a law enforcement officer enters the curtilage and con-
ducts a warrantless search, he can be viewed not only as invading 
a property area protected by the fourth amendment but also as in-
truding upon the defendant's reasonable expectations of privacy 
regarding objects and activities hidden from view within the curtilage. 
In other situations, however, courts could reach conflicting 
results by applying the expectations test and the protected areas test. 
116. See, e.g., in addition to the cases discussed in the text at notes 117-23 infra, 
State v. Crea, 305 Minn. 342, 345, 233 N.W.2d 736, 739 (1975). 
It should be noted that Justice Harlan alluded to the open field-curtilage distinc-
tion in his concurring opinion in Katz, when he interpreted the Court's opinion as 
holding that an enclosed telephone booth is an area like a home, but unlike a field, 
in which a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy. 
389 U.S. at 360. 
117. 388 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1968). 
118. 388 F.2d at 857. 
119. 388 F.2d at 857. 
120. 388 F.2d at 858. 
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The contradictory holdings in Fullbright v. United States121 and 
United States v. Kim122 are illustrative of this possibility. In Full-
bright, the court upheld the admissibility of evidence that federal 
agents had gathered by using binoculars to observe the defendants' 
activities inside a shed that was a part of the curtilage of a clefend-
ant's house. In making their observations, the agents had stood out-
side the curtilage in an open field owned by a defendant: The court 
refused to declare the search unreasonable, noting that the observa-
tions by the agents would have been proscribed had they physically 
breached the curtilage. The court did note that, in light of Katz, 
some circumstances might exist-though the court did not discuss 
what they might be-in which observation from an open field would 
violate the fourth amendment. Even so, it relied on Hester in con-
cluding that the observations in the instant case could not be deemed 
an unreasonable search.123 
In Kim, the court applied the expectations test and reached the 
opposite result on nearly identical facts. In that case, FBI agents 
used a telescope to observe gambling activities in the defendant's 
apartment. Even though the agents had not physically breached the 
curtilage, the court suppressed the evidence. The court stated that 
it is inconceivable that the government can intrude so far into a per-
son's home that it can detect the material he is reading and· still not 
be considered to have engaged in a search that violates the fourth 
amendment.124 
The result in· Fullbright under the protected areas test is 
troubling because the officers, while positioned in a place where they 
had a right to be, were able to observe the defendants' activities only 
by using binoculars. This use of a device that increased their 
sensory perception in effect transplanted the agents into a location 
within the curtilage, where their unaided observation would have 
violated the fourth amendment.125 Thus, in order- to protect the 
values underlying the fourth amendment, courts should recognize 
that certain property interests-such as the home and surrounding 
areas functionally related to it-carry with them corresponding ex-
pectations of privacy from any kind of intrusion. The final section 
of this Note more fully explains the implications of this proposed 
standard. 
121. 392 F.2d 432 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 830 (1968). 
122. 415 F. Supp. 1252 (D. Hawaii 1976). 
123. 392 F.2d at 434-35. 
124. 415 F. Supp. at 1256. 
125. Under the plain view doctrine adopted in Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 
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ill. PROPERTY INTERESTS AS A Priori REASONABLE 
EXPECTATIONS 
Thus far, this discussion has suggested that the distinction 
between the protected areas standard and the expectation of privacy 
standard could be characterized as a dichotomy between property 
and privacy interests. The significance of the apparent dichotomy 
is evidenced by the fact that courts have sometimes applied these 
standards to similar factual settings and reached different results. 
This discussion has also demonstrated that the home is a protected 
area at the core of the fourth amendment. Given these two considera-
tions, this Note submits that the fourth amendment will provide more 
prinoipled protection if the expectations-protected areas distinction is 
no longer viewed as dichotomous. Rather, fourth amendment doc-
trine should recognize that certain property interests constitute ex-
pectations that should be predefined as "reasonable" and thereby 
immunized from reduction through advance notice or through insis-
tence upon unreasonable precautions. 
It is important to recognize that the protected areas standard as 
well as the expectations standard is rooted in considerations of 
privacy. The purpose of the fourth amendment is not to protect 
property per se; rather, houses are protected, as are papers and 
effects, not merely because of a possessory or ownership interest but 
also because of an interest in keeping them private.126 As the 
234 (1968), an observation within the plain view of a police officer who is positioned 
in a place where he has a right to be is not conceptually a "search" within the mean• 
ing of the fourth amendment. In Fullbright, the observations were made from a 
place where the federal agents had a right to be, since an officer may enter private 
property when his duties so require even though his conduct is technically a trespass. 
See United States v. Capps, 435 F.2d 637, 640 n.4 (9th Cir. 1970). However, the 
agents would not have been able to observe the defendants' illegal activities from the 
field if they had not used binoculars. Because the activities were in "plain view" 
only with the aid of devices that had the effect of transplanting the agents into a 
place where they had no right to be, it is questionable whether the plain view doctrine 
is applicable to the facts of Fullbright. In this regard it is noteworthy that the Kim 
court limited the plain view doctrine to an unaided plain view and thus held it in-
applicable to the facts of that case. 415 F. Supp. at 1256. · 
The plain view doctrine, with or without accounting for the added factor of 
devices that increase sensory perception, can be reconciled with both the protected 
areas and the reasonable expectation of privacy tests. Under the former, plain view 
observations are made outside protected areas; under the latter, there can be no rea• 
sonable expectation of privacy where such observations are possible. Moreover, 
either test can be used to determine whether the place from which the observation 
is made is a place where the police officer has a right to be. For an example of 
the use of the reasonable expectation of privacy test in making such a determination, 
see United States v. Johnson, No. 73.-2221 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 12, 1977) (Leventhal, J., 
concurring). It is noteworthy that Judge Leventhal determined the reasonableness 
of the expectation by reference to the open field-curtilage distinction, which indicates 
the continuing vitality of that protected areas concept. 
126. As 'Justice Marshall has noted, the property concepts that shaped early 
fourth amendment law attempted to define a sphere of personal privacy. Couch v. 
United States, 409 U.S. 322, 349 (1973) (dissenting opinion). 
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Supreme Court stated in Silverman v. United States:127 
A man can still control a small part of his environment, his house; 
he can retreat thence from outsiders, secure in the knowledge that 
they cannot get at him without disobeying the Constitution. That is 
still a sizeable hunk of liberty-worth protecting from encroachment. 
A sane, decent, civilized society must provide some such oasis, some 
shelter from public scrutiny, some insulated enclosure, some enclave, 
some inviolate place which is a man's castle.128 
Moreover, the protected areas standard is concerned with expec-
tations of privacy. To say that one knows that his home is an area 
protected from public. scrutiny is to say that one knows that his 
expectations of privacy in his home will be fulfilled. Thus, the dif-
ference between the expectations test and the protected areas test 
need not be characterized as involving a choice of protecting either 
property or privacy interests. Rather, the two standards are distin-
guishable on the basis of the protection each accords to fundamental 
expectations of privacy: the protected areas standard defines a set 
of expectations that, because people are entitled to hold them, re-
ceive protection regardless of governmental manipulation of actual 
expectations or judicial assessment of the adequacy of precaution, 
whereas the reasonable expectation of privacy standard leaves the 
protected set of expectations undefined. This analysis suggests that 
property notions should be used to define the minimum content of 
fourth amendment protection since the expectations test, standing 
alone, leaves the scope of protected expectations undefined and sub-
ject to manipulation by the government. If privacy as well as prop-
erty is to be protected adequately, people need to be secure i:Q. the 
knowledge that some areas exist that can never be subject to war-
rantless searches without a violation of the fourth amendment.120 
People need to know that the government cannot eliminate expecta-
tions of privacy for these areas through advance notice that the area 
is not protect.eel, and they should be assured that they need not take 
unduly burdensome precautions to prevent every conceivable· kind 
of investigative technique. 
If the difference between the protected areas test and the expec-
tation of privacy test is characterized as this Note suggests, then it 
is possible to protect both property interests and privacy interests 
simultaneously. Once it is recognized that the fourth amendment 
127. 365 U.S. 505 (1961). 
128. 365 U.S. at 511 n.4 (quoting with approval United States v. On Lee, ·193 
F.2d 306, 315-16 (2d Cir. 1951) (Frank, J., dissenting)), affd., 343 U.S. ·747 
(1952) ). 
129. Justice Douglas went so far as to insist that the fourth amendment creates 
a zone of privacy that police cannot enter even with a proper warrant. Warden v. 
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 325 (1967) (dissenting opinion). See generally Note, 90 
HARV. L. REV. 945, supra note 4. 
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protects the right to have certain expectations of privacy-those as-
sociated with the home and other areas functionally related to it-
it is no longer necessary to view property interests and privacy inter-
ests as dichotomous. Thus, by deeming the expectation of privacy 
in traditionally protected areas to be a priori "reasonable," because 
the holder of the property interest has a right to expect privacy, both 
the protected areas test and the expectations test are satisfied. 
Of course, it might be argued that even activities occurring in 
a protected area should not always be protected by the warrant re-
quirement of the fourth amendment. If an individual reveals his 
activities to the plain view of the public, it might be said that the 
individual has no right to an expectation of privacy. Furthermore, 
a police officer who perceives an activity in a protected area without 
trespassing upon the curtilage or enhancing his sensory abilities by 
resorting to artificial devices should not be subject to the fourth 
amendment. Thus, the set of expectations to which one is entitled 
may be predefined-in the same sense that the term "search" is pre-
defined not to include observations of evidence in plain view130-
to exclude those observations that are accomplished without either 
trespass or artificial devices. 131 
This Note suggests that the minimum content of the fourth 
amendment can be determined under the traditional constitutionally 
protected areas test. Thus, the Note proposes a two-stage test to 
determine the constitutionality of warrantless searches. First, the 
court must inquire whether the search occurred in a constitutionally 
protected area. If so, the court's inquiry must end and the search 
must be declared invalid, unless it falls under one of the recognized 
exceptions to the warrant requirement. 132 If the search was con-
ducted elsewhere, the court then must apply the two-part test sug-
gested by Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz with the modi-
fications suggested in section I above. In effect, the test pro-
posed by this Note corrects the fundamental flaw of the Katz test 
by recognizing that persons are entitled to have certain expectations 
of privacy. 
Professor Amsterdam has suggested that the courts should 
130. See note 125 supra. 
131. It might appear that merely dropping the requirement that a defendant have 
a subjective expectation of privacy would be sufficient to ensure adequate protection 
for the right to have certain expectations. Under this analysis, the reasonableness 
requirement would by itself be sufficient to protect fourth amendment rights without 
insisting that certain expectations be predefined as reasonable. This test, however, 
would still allow courts to make ad hoc judgments of reasonableness concerning 
searches in the home, and thus the right to have expectations of privacy in the home 
would not receive recognition as a core value of the fourth amendment. 
132. See note 88 supra. 
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approach fourth amendment issues by asking what we as members 
of society want to demand from government.133 This Note suggests 
a similar approach: courts should decide fourth amendment issues 
by asking what we are entitled to expect from the government, rather 
than by asking what the government will allow us to expect. 
133. Amsterdam, supra note 6, at .384. 
